

# Journées du management

## Systemes d'information et management des risques



# Cas emblématiques





FROM: PEPSICO



# L'humain au centre




# Des perceptions





# Données – Informations et Connaissances

- Données : Indépendance
- Information : Sens
- Connaissance : Abstraction









# Systemes d'information : les parties prenantes





# Quelques grands auteurs en systèmes d'information

- H.A. Simon<sup>†</sup>
- W. Orlikowski
- R.L. Daft et K. Weick  
et R.H. Lengel
- M. Scott Morton
- V. Venkatesh et F.D.  
Davis
- R. Reix<sup>†</sup>



# De l'information à la décision





# Le risque décisionnel

- Effets négatifs de la décision
- Intrinsèque et personnalisé



# Un article essentiel

- Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. (2009). Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree. *American Psychologist*, 64(6), 515-526.

## Conditions for Intuitive Expertise

### *A Failure to Disagree*

Daniel Kahneman  
Gary Klein  
Princeton University  
Applied Research Associates

*This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often viewed as conflicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvelous and sometimes flawed, the authors attempt to map the boundary conditions that separate true intuitive skill from overconfident and biased impressions. They conclude that evaluating the likely quality of an intuitive judgment requires an assessment of the predictability of the environment in which the judgment is made and of the individual's opportunity to learn the regularities of that environment. Subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judgment accuracy.*

**Keywords:** intuition, expertise, overconfidence, heuristics, judgment

In this article we report on an effort to compare our views on the issues of intuition and expertise and to discuss the evidence for our respective positions. When we launched this project, we expected to disagree on many issues, and with good reason: One of us (GK) has spent much of his career thinking about ways to promote reliance on expert intuition in executive decision making and identifies himself as a member of the intellectual community of scholars and practitioners who study naturalistic decision making (NDM). The other (DK) has spent much of his career running experiments in which intuitive judgment was commonly found to be flawed; he is identified with the "heuristics and biases" (HB) approach to the field.

A surprise awaited us when we got together to consider our joint field of interest. We found ourselves agreeing most of the time. Where we initially disagreed, we were usually able to converge upon a common position. Our shared beliefs are much more specific than the commonplace that expert intuition is sometimes remarkably accurate and sometimes off the mark. We accept the commonplace, of course, but we also have similar opinions about more specific questions: What are the activities in which skilled intuitive judgment develops with experience? What are the activities in which experience is more likely to produce overconfidence than genuine skill? Because we largely agree about the answers to these questions we also favor generally similar recommendations to organizations seeking to improve the quality of judgments and decisions. In spite of all this agreement, however, we find that we are

still separated in many ways: by divergent attitudes, preferences about facts, and feelings about fighting words such as "bias." If we are to understand the differences between our respective communities, such emotions must be taken into account.

We begin with a brief review of the origins and precursors of the NDM and HB approaches, followed by a discussion of the most prominent points of contrast between them (NDM: Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsombok, 1993; HB: Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Next we present some claims about the conditions under which skilled intuitions develop, followed by several suggestions for ways to improve the quality of judgments and choices.

## Two Perspectives

### *Origins of the Naturalistic Decision Making Approach*

The NDM approach, which focuses on the successes of expert intuition, grew out of early research on master chess players conducted by deGroot (1946/1978) and later by Chase and Simon (1973). DeGroot showed that chess grand masters were generally able to identify the most promising moves rapidly, while mediocre chess players often did not even consider the best moves. The chess grand masters mainly differed from weaker players in their unusual ability to appreciate the dynamics of complex positions and quickly judge a line of play as promising or fruitless. Chase and Simon (1973) described the performance of chess experts as a form of perceptual skill in which complex patterns are recognized. They estimated that chess masters acquire a repertoire of 50,000 to 100,000 immediately recognizable patterns, and that this repertoire enables them to identify a good move without having to calculate all possible contingencies. Strong players need a decade of serious play to assemble this large collection of basic patterns, but of course they achieve impressive levels

Daniel Kahneman, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; Gary Klein, Applied Research Associates, Fairport, Ohio.

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# Les deux facteurs qui bouleversent le concept de risque


Mondialisation

IT

Puissance



Ubiquité



# Les enjeux

- Risques et cascades d'information

*Vitesse et amplitude*






# Les enjeux

- Risques et grands volumes de données

Signaux faibles



# Les enjeux

- Risques et réseaux sociaux



# Les enjeux

- Info-guerre



# Gestion du risque et bon sens

« Supprimer les risques ... »



« conduit à les augmenter... »



# Gestion du risque et bon sens

Supprimer les risques ... en revenant aux temps anciens ?



# Esquisse de solutions

- Comprendre les enjeux
- Limiter les procédures et assurer une veille
- Micro-coordination
- Retours d'expériences renouvelés

....

- Assumer...

Merci pour votre attention

Questions & Débats



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